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CASE COMMENTS
regard" for that of the Legislature in the face of the constitutional
provision which to all intents and purposes contemplates a subjective
determination. Thus it would seem that under this section of the Kentucky Constitution, the question of whether or not the Legislature
exercised due regard for territory, business, and population is solely
for that body, and its determination upon that matter should not be
subject to a review of a co-ordinate branch of the government.
B. H. HENARD.
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF VICIOUSNESS OF DOMESTIC
ANIMAL
Plaintiff, seeking damages for personal injuries due to the bite of
an allegedly vicious dog, was not permitted to offer evidence that the
dog had severely injured a bird dog and was vicious toward other
dogs, or that the dog had a general reputation for viciousness. The
court said: "The first (plaintiff's exception to the rejection of evidence
that defendant's dog had bitten other dogs) is quite a novel proposition. The instant question was the dog's propensity to attack a human.
...
In an action for personal injury it is not sufficient to show that
the owner of a dog had knowledge that it was accustomed to bite
other animals." Fowler v. Helck, 278 Ky. 361, 128 S. W. (2d) 564
(1939).
The popular belief that every dog is entitled to one bite is not
supported by authority. It is not essential to show that the dog has
actually bitten some person and that the owner is cognizant of that
fact, provided the owner has seen or heard enough to convince a man
of ordinary prudence that the animal is inclinded to commit the class
of injuries involved. The question is whether the notice is sufficient
"to put the owner on his guard, and to require him to anticipate the
injury which has actually occurred."' Goode v. Martin- held that the
owner's knowledge of the dangerous character of his dogs might be
Inferred from his habit of tying them by day. The Restatement of the
Lazo of Torts makes the possessor of a domestic animal liable where
he has reason to know (knows or from facts known to him should
know) that the animal has dangerous propensities abnormal to its
class.3
"Reynolds v. Hussey, 64 N. H. 64, 5 Atl. 458 (1886). See Rider v.
White, 65 N. Y. 54, 22 Am. Rep. 600 (1875), where defendant who knew
that his seven large watch dogs rushed out and pursued passersby,
and had posted a sign "Beware of Dogs" was held to have had knowledge of their propensity to attack and bite mankind.
-57 Md. 606, 40 Am. Rep. 448 (1881) (the defendant's dogs were
loosed at night to guard his property and were personally tied each
morning by the defendant).
3Section 509. Brune v. De Benedetty, 261 S. W. 930 (Mo. App.
3$24), seems to support this section. The plaintiff based his case upon
the viciousness of the defendant's dog superinduced by rabies. The
court said that defendant knew the propensity of a rabid dog to attack
mankind.
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If the possessor of a domestic animal may be liable for the first
injury resulting from its viciousness, what evidence is sufficient to
show the possessor is cognizant of the vicious or abnormal propensity
of his animal? The principal case does no more to answer this question than 'to cite a number of cases holding that knowledge of a particular propensity is not sufficient to show knbwledge of another
propensity. Thus, Tw'igg v. Riland,4 cited by the court, states that
"The notice which will charge the owner or keeper with liability for
-the vicious conduct of the animal must be notice that it was inclined
to do the particularmischief that has been done." (Italics added.) This
is supported by the fact that under old pleadings it was necessary to
plead in case of an injury to mankind by a dog, that the dog was of
a ferocious nature and "accustomed to bite mankind. ' 6 Keightlinger V.
7
EganT
is in accord and gives the reason for the rule by saying that the
dog might have had such a disposition as to other animals, but not
towards persons.
The real issue in the principal case was the admissibility of evidence that the dog had fought other dogs, rather than the sufficiency
8
of such evidence. The court cites no cases on this issue but assumes,
apparently, that the insufficiency of such evidence is ample reason
for not allowing the same to be admitted. Norris v. Warner' held It
to be error to permit the plaintiff to prove, over the objection of the
defendant, the general reputation of the dog for viciousness and that
it was accustomed to attack other dogs. This case is directly in line
with the holding of the principal case in that the question involved
was the admissibility of such evidence rather than the sufficiency of
that evidence after it had been admitted.
It does not follow that if evidence showing the dog's viciousness
toward and attack upon animals is insufficient to establish scienter of
the owner that the dog is likely to attack mankind, that such evidence
is inadmissible. Certain evidence may be corroborative although alone
it is not a sufficient basis for the predication of liability. Rowe v.
Rhrmantraut"O supports this view in holding that the evidence of attack
on other animals "while not in itself sufficient to show that appellant's
dog was malevolently inclined towards persons, yet when the fact was
established that he had attacked people, the incident might be considered as bearing upon the question of the dog's temper."
CLA ENCE COXNELMUS.

4 62 Md. 380, 50 Am. Rep. 226 (1884).

5Id. at 386.
See Osborn v. Choqueel, L. R. 2 Q. B. 109 (1896).
7 65 Ill. 235 (1872).
'However, Norris v. Warner, 59 Ill. App. 300 (1894), which was
cited in regard to the sufficiency of such evidence is in point.
'59 Ill. App. 300 (1894).
1092 Minn. 171, 99 N. W. 211 (1904).

